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Only ten years since Derrida’s death, with critical detachment, is it possible to be in touch with him again, to start from the beginning of his philosophizing in company with Plato, and from this vantage point to re-read Dissemination? What really stands between Plato and Derrida?
 In the first page of Pharmacia Derrida writes: “We will take off here from the Phaedrus ... Only a blind or grossly insensitive reading, could indeed spread the rumour that Plato was simply condemning the writer’s activity”.1 Hence the question: Is the nexus writing/pharmakon profitable for thinking of something ambivalent and irreducible, present and absent, something bearer of indefinitely deferred presence in the play of infinite real or imaginary substitutions? The main enterprise of this essay orbits about the problematic of writing, understood as τέχνη, but also as a key locus of relation Plato/ Derrida. Here technology - and thinking of its function and value- I would like to argue, regards the technical and non-technical, the practical and theoretical, seeing that thinking of their function remains always a “parasitical contamination”, seeing that writing is another speech, and, according this statement, we may regard Plato as he who paves the way for Derrida.
In what follows, through textual analysis I will focus on some interesting unrolling, connected and disconnected threads by discussing the readings of different scholars and philosophers such as the disputed classicist E. A. Havelock, the historians of ancient philosophy G. Reale and C. H. Kahn. In particular I will explore, first, the nexus speech/writing, and argue that historically Plato was a bi-medial philosopher and writer, an aspect taken for granted, but not sufficiently attended by scholarship. In the second part of the essay I hold that the Derridean reading of ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ discovers a special deconstruction at work within Plato’s dialogues. In the light of the manifold τέχνη, and of the hybrid Khora, at the end the apparent ambiguity in Plato’s stance and Derrida’s φάρμακον invites us to identify Plato as the Father of deconstruction.
 
 

















Stranger: We shall find it necessary in self-defence to put to the question that
pronouncement of father Parmenides (Ton tou patros Parmenidou logon), and establish by main force that what is not (mē on), in some respect has a being, and conversely that what is (on), in a way is not. Theaetetus: It is plain that the course of the argument requires us to maintain that at all costs (Phainetai to toiouton diamakheteon en tois logois). Sophist 241d.
 






(The historic, linguistic, sociological and philosophical context).
What does writing mean for Plato historically? In comparison to the classical monographs and fundamental studies on Plato, conducted between the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, the studies of the last decades, inspired amongst others by E. A. Havelock with his Preface to Plato, have managed to focus on the historical, literary, and cultural context in which the great Athenian lived. Re-readings, widening of horizons, new and original perspectives supported by more critical and refined research-tools, have opened up new interpretations on the cultural turning point of the last years of the 5th century and the first years of the 4th century B. C. in Athens and in Greece. The old and new problems of exegesis, the debate on the developmental approach, i.e. the evolutive hypothesis about Platonic thought, the unwritten doctrines, the privileging of the writer over the philosopher, and the relationship between speech and writing within the thought of the great Athenian, have all been thoroughly discussed.
In the first part of this essay, which refers to some writings of scholars and philosophers forward the huge Platonic literature, my ambition is not to deliver an exhaustive account of the vexata quaestio speech/writing. Moving from the historical, literary, and philosophical outline of Fifth century Greece, my project is to emphasize that Plato, philosopher and writer, must be regarded as a bi-medial intellectual, lover and appraiser of the two means of spoken and written communication.
 Writing, ambiguous instrument, innovative technology of word, ennobled by its requirement of mimesis, appeared in Greece after the first half of the 6th century in public documents and papers, used by professional men- for the most part non-Athenians, physicians, rhetoricians, historians, and by dramatists fortheir sketches. But, during the sophistic era, when dialectic was carried into the agora, writing became a problem. It caused a breakthrough in speech, a difference, a semantic, logical and epistemological shift. How did this change happen? How did the Greeks accomplish it in such a short period? According to Havelock, the answer lies in a fundamental novelty: “If the educational system transmitting the Hellenic mores had indeed relied on perpetual stimulation of the young in a kind of hypnotic trance, to use Plato’ language, how did the Greeks ever wake up?








What is the essential, the inner relation between writing (literature) and philosophy?
To respond this question I will refer to two different scholars, historians of ancient philosophy: G. Reale and C. H. Kahn. After some references to W. Jaeger and H. Gomperz, and after taking a stand on numerous passages from dialogues, in part agreeing with Havelock, the Italian scholar G. Reale, in his book “Platone. Alla ricerca della sapienza segreta”, writes that Republic, judged as a dialogue about the state, is indeed a pedagogical and revolutionary book, the manifesto of a new, philosophicalπαιδεία supported by the new vehicle of writing. But, even if in accordance with Havelock on some points, Reale adds that true, deep thinking, cannot be conditioned by technology. He claims that the most suitable vehicle of philosophy is dialectic orality, and just for this Plato uttered the “unwritten doctrines”. In a significant passage Reale writes, “Plato, a great writer, was not only aware he was the most prolific writer of his epoch, of which he gave proof by deed. In crossing from one culture to another, he discovered that the new means of communication namely writing, besides having advantages also had disadvantages, and introduced some elements which could render communication ineffectual and more harmful”.9 According to Reale there are two Platos, Plato the great writer of dialogues, and the esoteric Plato of dialectic orality, of the unwritten doctrines. The written text, Reale adds, produces a relation of difference, distance and alienation between him who writes and him who reads. It cannot effectively accomplish the task of teaching, which consists in going into the corners and depths of the soul. But, here is not in question that speech is good, writing is bad, here is raised the problem of the proper and improper modes of writing, the problem that each art has its good and bad points. In contrast to Reale and his privileging of speech, I prefer to follow the more credible third pivot point: Plato blames oral tradition, but also deplores bad writings. Both means cannot be taken at face value, they are valuable provided that they are compared to a pre-existing model of beauty and truth, and are inspired by divine madness, by god Eros, appointed to give wings to some, not to others. More, by the reading of the Symposium- a sort of manifesto of the poet-philosopher in which φιλόσοφος is defined lover of logos, daemon inspired by Eros- we can grasp the value of the eroticism of research, the eroticism of writing through the splendid image of wings, feathers (πτερόν), of symbolic value, over and over again evoked in mythology, in culture, and in Greek technology (Daedalus’wings, Icarus’flight). “First, he is ever poor, and far from tender or beautiful as most suppose him: rather he is hard and parched, shoeless and homeless; always on the bare ground, with no bedding, taking his rest on doorsteps and waysides in the open air; true to his mother’s nature, he never dwells with want. But, he takes after his father in scheming for all that is beautiful and good; for he is brave, impetuous and high-strung, a famous hunter, always weaving some stratagem; desirous and competent of wisdom, throughout life he pursues the truth; a master of jugglery, witchcraft, and artful speech. By birth neither immortal nor mortal” (Sym. 203). With different approach, in the Preface of Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, C. H. Kahn reminds us that Plato was “the first author to offer a systematic definition of the goals and methods of philosophy” and that Plato is “the only major philosopher who is also a supreme literary artist”. Kahn focuses his critical study particularly on the Gorgias, on account of, in his view this dialogue is the key to understand the Platonic work “It is important to bear in mind that the publication of the Gorgias must have catapulted Plato from the ranks of the minor Socratics to his permanent position among the supreme masters of Greek letters”10. According to Kahn, Plato’s contemporaries clearly perceived that by writing the Gorgias and the Protagoras, he had produced literary masterpieces. In the Gorgias, Socrates is near to anger when Callicles seems to ascribe to rhetoric an ambiguous, even if fascinating technique, the primacy due to philosophy. In Callicles’ view philosophy makes one feel ill at ease, makes one blush, throws one into crisis by its frequent contradictions, and makes one feel constantly in between knowing and not knowing. Maybe it is suitable for the young. An unsure adult, in between knowing and not knowing, is not a true man. He is not fully developed because he has no courage, and is ill and decrepit. Here, the reader is confronted with a paradoxical scene and findsit difficult to understand which of the two, Callicles or Socrates, is the wise man. The mimetic peculiarity of Platonic dialogues gets the upper hand by the continuous alternation between akribeia and mimesis. To the joke of the Thracian servant provoked by Thales falling into the well, we must now add the irony of Callicles who dictates, with his barbs, another definition of philosophy. Later, Kahn retakes his thesis “the man who in my view was only an occasional author before the composition of the Gorgias in his late thirties, became from then on something like a full-time writer”.11 The literary form of the Platonic dialogues is the finished product of a careful, ironic, subtle writer who uses the dialogical form to involve the reader. Plato, as successor to Socrates and Euripides, tries to compete with Thucydides, takes position against tradition, and claims that the Greek world of Sophocles, Homer, and Hesiod is false. In the final part of his book Kahn concludes that Plato opted for the most efficient and suitable medium for the type of interlocutor at hand, “if this view is correct, the author and his conception of writing remain essentially the same for the Socratic and for the later dialogues: it is only the target audience that changes. However, Plato’s conception of writing is scarcely separable from his conception of philosophy (my italics). So our conclusion has interesting implications for the apparent development or revision of the theory of Forms in the later dialogues and the relation of all this to the “unwritten doctrines”.12 Writing as techno-logy, means of post-Parmenidean thought, spoken metaphorically withgrammatike, and vehicle of logos, enters thus into dialectic play of mixture. Plato puts the speech/writing dichotomy in a more ample and mixed picture, the picture of sciences and techniques, of dialectic and ethics, a kind of interdisciplinary and inter-technique complex, a different aggregate which unravels and takes into account the multiplicity, a generative multiplicity, a dissemination which in turn flows into multiplication of unities. The eroticism of Platonic inquiry presupposes the aporia of good and evil, of human and divine, of pure and impure and gives rise to a super-speech, arche-writing, in order to go behind and beyond, a technique that exceeds either category of presence or of absence, a special tension in order to go into and onto the mixture.




(From the exegetic, historical, philosophical commentaries on Plato to the Derridean reading of Plato's Pharmacy).
 
On 2 October 1994 Jacques Derrida participated at the round table in the Philosophy department of Villanova University. He said that his work was based on the classics of Greek philosophy, “. . . the way that I try to read Plato, Aristotle and others is not a way of,  let's say, commenting or repeating or conserving this heritage. It is an analysis which tries to find out how their thinking works or doesn't work, [an analysis] of the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity within their own corpus, as well as the law of this self-deconstruction. Deconstruction is not a method or a tool that you apply from the outside to something; deconstruction is something which happens, which happens inside. There is a deconstruction at work within Plato's work, for instance. As my colleagues know, each time I study Plato, I find, I try to find some heterogeneity in his own corpus (my italics), and to see how, for instance, the Timaeus - within the Timaeus the theme of the chora is incompatible with his so-called 'system'... I love reading Greek. It is difficult, this thing, a very difficult task, and when I read Plato I enjoy it, and I feel, if anything, it's difficult; I think it's an infinite task. The project is not behind me; Plato is in front of me.” 13 It deals with a precious fragment of intellectual autobiography by which we understand some aspects of his way of doing deconstruction. Well, but is really Plato the first to overturn Platonism, or at least to point out the direction for the reversal of Platonism, as Gilles Deleuze said? The aim of Derrida is to force the texts saying something different from what they had always seemed to say (double reading): the first reading that follows the tendencies of the dominant reading- situating the text within the metaphysical tradition of the West- the second(s), not an arbitrary step, the one that takes rigor, knowledge of the history and the context of philosophical and philological means. In Derrida’s view, deconstructive analytical persistence and acuity remain a promise of work that mostly is still caught between the poles of faithful exegesis and impatient criticism, as he showed exemplarily by his strategic misreading inDissemination.
‘Let us begin again’ Derrida writes at the opening of Plato’s Pharmacy “. . . the dissimulation of the woven texture can in any case take centuries to undo its web. The example we shall propose of this will not, seeing that we are dealing with Plato, be the Statesman, which will have come to mind first, no doubt because of the paradigm of the weaver, and especially because of the paradigm of the paradigm, the example of the example-writing-which immediately precedes it. We will come back to that only after a long detour. We will take off here from the Phaedrus”.14 In the first part of Dissemination, Derrida discusses the complex network of terms, relations and significations associated with the word φάρμακον adopted in and surrounding Plato’s texts. The word pharmakon in Greek has multiple and contradictory meanings including drug, healing remedy or medicine, enchanted potion or philter, charm or spell, poison, and so on. This word, which serves Plato in some of his most striking passages, reveals an operative force that sustains his discourse within the closure of metaphysical oppositions and hierarchical valuations. At the same time, it differs from the systematic structures it produces. In holding that a superficial reading of the Platonic corpus has spread the conviction that Plato condemned the art of writing, Derrida calls attention to the Phaedrus, which he defines as a decisive dialogue for the whole issue, and the very turning point of the activity of the philosopher-writer Plato. For Derrida, the Platonic condemnation of writing in the Phaedrus is not univocal. On the one hand, Plato maintains that gramme taking the place of the living voice or of the presence of phone falsifies the philosophical discourse, cannot defend itself, and cannot reply. On the other, he underlines the duplicity and ambivalence of writing. As Derrida explains, pharmakon can mean remedy and poison, good and evil, cure and its exact opposite; can mean either inside or outside, speech or writing. In this way writing reveals another writing, masked by its derived or common meaning (archewriting). It is not matter of simply inverting the received order of priorities so that writing will somehow take precedence over speech and its various associated values. With the ambiguity of Platonic attitude towards gramme, the question is whether to consider pharmakon as the image of the entire history of metaphysics, the image of differance of Being and entity. Derrida creatively presents his interpretation of the Phaedrus, and emphasizes the critical significance of Plato’s use of the word pharmakon, as that which produces a complex, self-contradicting and ambiguous account of the metaphysical opposition of speech and writing. Derrida retrieves, too, a profoundly important Platonic insight when he shows the way in which the textual moment brings us towards nothing less than the very passage to philosophy. Textually he writes, “Socrates compares the written texts Phaedrus has brought to a drug (pharmakon). This pharmakon, this ‘medicine’, this philter, which acts both as remedy and poison, already introduces itself into the body of the discourse with all its ambivalence. This charm, this spellbinding virtue, this power of fascination, can be-alternately or simultaneously- beneficent and maleficent”.15 The myth of the birth of writing, referred to at the end of the dialogue, is thus rendered: “I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. He it was who invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most important of all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god Thamus, who lived in the upper region, which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon” (Phaid. 274cd). Theuth, by offering the King the alphabet, maintains that this science will give Egyptians more wisdom and will enhance their memory (this discovery is a medicine for wisdom and memory). But, the King is by no means persuaded and replies: “Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practise their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters, which are not part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them”. (Phaid. 274-275). No doubt, the problem with writing is that it substitutes mere inscriptions for the authentic living presence of spoken language. It also provides a pseudo-memory in that it is the substitution of mnemonic devices for genuine, living wisdom, or genuine memory as anamnesis (un-forgetting). The best one can hope for is that this new invention will not be taken seriously, but treated as a mere pastime! As in numerous Platonic dialogues, here is evident a kind of corroding, ironic, critical, deconstructive antelitteram or self-deconstructivePlatonic attitude. Or, if we prefer, a very personal hermeneutics apt to divide, to decompose, and to burst before looking for the whole. In this dialogue the reader, familiar with Plato, clearly perceives- as nowhere else- the sensation of being face to face with a double Plato, one that is playing hide and seek, now in the role of King Thamus, now of demigod Teuth. Some scholars have defined this dialogue as the dialogue of seduction, and certainly Plato understands, in the meantime he is writing, that he is despising writing, and thus contradicting himself. Plato understands he has fallen thus into a performative contradiction.16 Or, to put it differently, can he (Plato) do so because he is in a scene? “The imprints (tupoi) of writing don’t inscribe, is Theaetetus’ hypothesis, imprinted in the wax of the soul, replying so to the spontaneous, autochthonous movements of psychic life. Knowing that he can commit or leave his thought to the outside, to the record, to physical traces, spatial and superficial, spread on a plane table, the man who has the technique of writing, will rely to it.”17 This man knows that, in his absence, writing will give him vitality via his words, even if he is dead. But he also knows that such a technique will exercise memory even less, and he will become forgetful in the long run. The sophists, too, exercised memory, “But, we have seen, it was in order to enable themselves to speak without knowing, to recite without judgment, without regard for truth, in order to give signs. Or rather in order to sell them. Through this economy of signs, the sophists are indisputably men of writing at the moment they are protesting they are not. But isn’t Plato, too, through a symmetrical effect of reversal? Not only because he is actually a writer…and cannot, whether de facto or de jure, explain what dialectics is without recourse to writing; not only because he judges that the repetition of the same is necessary in anamnesis; but also because he judges it indispensable as an inscription in the type.”18 The outward appearance of the alphabet, which Thamus refers to, consists in the mobility of signs that can be incised on stone, on sand, on other materials. Being written, the alphabet implies a technical jump, the invention of a system of manageable elements, silently speaking, and, at the same time, cure and technique, device, appearance of logos, deceptive prosthesis, and deferred form of language. Plato understands that the graphic representation, exact and faithful of human sounds, by “digital letters”-which can be manipulated and combined, in an endless variety- can determine a turning point. He understands, too, that a slight shift, change or exchange of writing could modify the meaning of words. On his part, Derrida, while on a more plain reading is not so much concerned about any conflict between speaking and writing, about the proper and improper use of both spoken and written language, at the same time he manages to corrupt the plain sense of the Phaedrus into a diatribe against writing. Through multiple plays on word pharmakon , he throws himself towards a kind of collapsing into a series of binaries: Theuth and his father, and by implication, writing and speech, Plato's story and Egyptian father, Plato's story and Egyptian myth, philosophy and mythology. In distinguishing himself from his opposite, Theuth also imitates Thamus and becomes his sign and representative, obeys and conforms to him, finally replaces him. He is thus the father's other, and stands for subversive movement of replacement. The god of writing is at once his father, his son, and himself. He cannot assign a fixed spot in the play of differences. Perhaps, is Theuth- Derrida thinking of himself? Sly, slippery, and masked, an intriguer, like Hermes, he is neither king nor jack, rather a sort of joker, a floating signifier, one who puts play into play. Later on, Derrida comes close to calling parricide the option for writing, asserting that writing is not only technique, it is also the condition of Platonic dialectic, the repetition of logos, and epochal destiny that involves man and universe. Writing is the possibility of speaking/non speaking, to go forward unhiddeness from hiddeness, to point out the former differance of the whole, the former structure of Being. Differance is not a concept truer than presence; rather the relatively indeterminate space opened up by process of differentiation in the condition of the production of meaning. Differanceinvestigates the subversion of every kingdom. It is the medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement and the play that links them among themselves, reverses them and makes one side cross over into the other: soul/body, good/evil, inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing. In Derrida’s view, it would seem that Plato needs what he apparently condemns, that Plato is persuaded to resort to writing “because he cannot in fact explain what dialectics is, without appealing to writing”.
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